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Fixing New York's State Education Aid Dinosaur: A Proposal Introduction
New York State provides aid to local schools through a confusing maze of aid programs that are, according to many commentators, unfair to the neediest school districts, often defined as those with many students who are poor or otherwise "at risk." For example, New York City, which, by any measure, is one of the neediest districts, currently receives less aid per pupil than the average district in the state. On January 9, 2001, in the case of Campaign for Fiscal Equity vs. State of New York (719 N.Y.S2d 475, 150 Ed. Law Rep. 834) , the New York State Supreme Court brought new salience to this issue. In a strongly worded opinion, Justice Leland DeGrasse ruled that the current educational aid system violates the state=s constitutional requirement to provide a "sound basic education" and needs to be reformed.
1 Among other things, Justice DeGrasse labeled the failure to account for the needs of at-risk students "one of the great failings of the State school financing system" and declared that "New York City does not receive State aid commensurate with the needs of its students."
This policy brief proposes a new formula for distributing educational aid in New York State, a formula designed to direct aid to the districts that, through no fault of their own, are in the greatest need of assistance. High-need districts are those with high educational costs or low property wealth. This policy brief begins by explaining why the cost of education varies from one school district to the next. It then shows how variation in the cost of education across districts can be incorporated into a state education aid program that brings all districts up to some minimally adequate performance level. This approach is applied to New York State. Specifically, I propose a new education aid formula for New York State that would bring all school districts up to an adequate performance defined with reference to the new Regents graduation standards. This policy brief also explores various ways to share the cost of this program between school districts and the state.
The issue of educational costs is not a new one in New York State. One of the current state aid programs, Extraordinary Needs Aid, adjusts for the costs associated with at-risk students. However, Extraordinary Needs Aid accounts for only 5 percent of the state aid budget and its cost adjustment is ad hoc and incomplete. Another program, Excess Cost Aid, which accounts for another 14 percent of the state aid budget, reimburses school districts for some of their spending on students who have special needs, but this reimbursement is not based on any estimate of educational costs that are outside a district's control. Educational costs should be estimated systematically and considered in all aid programs.
This focus on educational costs is consistent with the requirements imposed by the New York State Supreme Court in CFE vs. New York State. Specifically, Justice DeGrasse required the State of New York to ascertain, "to the extent possible, the actual costs of providing a sound basic education in districts around the State" and to design reforms 1. ensuring that every school district has the resources necessary for providing the opportunity for a sound basic education, 2. taking into account variations in local costs.
The proposal offered in this brief provides one way to meet these requirements.
Defining and Estimating Educational Costs
A school district's educational cost is the amount it must spend per pupil to obtain a given level of student performance, based on factors outside its control.
Educational cost is analogous to a cost of living. Just as households in some locations must pay more than other households to obtain the same goods and services, some school districts must pay more than others to obtain the same level of student performance.
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Educational costs need to be considered in state aid formulas. The state creates school districts that face widely different educational costs. Just as Social Security compensates recipients when the cost of living goes up, state aid programs should compensate school districts that face higher costs through no fault of their own. Otherwise, students who find themselves in high-cost districts will face poorer funding-and poorer educational opportunities-than students in other districts.
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How to Estimate Educational Costs
The key problem, of course, is that a school district's spending, which is easy to observe, is not the same thing as its cost, which cannot be observed directly. Spending is influenced by cost, but it also reflects factors over which a district has control, such as the quality of the schools and managerial efficiency. The state should not compensate a school district for high spending, only for external factors that push up its educational costs.
The great challenge facing any effort to measure educational cost, therefore, is to distinguish a situation in which a district's spending is high because of the choices it makes and a situation in which a district's spending is high because of cost factors outside its control. This cannot be done without a statistical procedure that determines the impact of one variable on spending, holding other variables constant.
The statistical procedures needed to study educational costs are well known to scholars. These procedures also have been used in aid formulas; for example, Massachusetts has relied on an aid formula derived from a statistical analysis of education costs.
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Wage Costs
The first component of educational costs is wage costs: some districts must pay more than other districts to hire teachers of equal quality. The salary needed to attract teachers away from the private sector is higher in some districts (particularly those in large metropolitan areas) than in others. The salary needed to compensate teachers for working in a school with more at-risk students is higher in some districts (particularly central cities) than in others.
It is important to note that wage cost variation within a region (the second point above) is just as important as variation across regions (the first point). Wage costs are much higher in New York City than in its suburbs, for example. An index used in several proposals, including one by the Midstate School Finance Consortium, has a lower value for New York City than for some of its suburbs and places wage costs in New York City just 4 percent above the state average. These results are simply not credible. 5 No aid formula should be based on the absurd claim that most teachers would accept jobs in the New York City schools for a mere 4 percent premium over the average salary in the state. A more reasonable index, which still does not account for wage variation within a region, is provided by the New York State Board of Regents (2000) . This index places wage costs in New York City and Long Island 52 percent above the state average.
The importance of teacher wage cost variation, both between and within regions, was clearly stated by Justice LaGrasse in CFE v. New York. Specifically, he pointed out that New York City competes in a common labor market for teachers and other college-educated individuals with Westchester, Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, and, to a lesser extent, Orange and Putnam counties. New York City is at a competitive disadvantage in this labor market, principally because New York City School teachers make substantially less and generally labor under more difficult working conditions than their suburban counterparts. Using data for almost 150,000 full-time teachers in New York State in 1999, I have estimated a wage cost index that controls for teacher quality and accounts for competition from the private sector and for the harshness of the classroom environment (see Table 1 ).
6 I find that wage costs vary significantly across districts, with higher wages downstate than upstate and much higher wages in cities than in suburbs. According to my index, wage costs are 52 percent above the state average in New York City, but only 9 percent above the state average in the typical New York City suburb.
Costs Associated with At-Risk Students
The second component of education costs, which has been recognized for many decades by scholars and policy makers, reflects the extra expenses needed to educate "at-risk" students. Dozens of academic studies have demonstrated that school districts containing a high concentration of students from poor or single-parent families, with limited English proficiency, or with severe disabilities must pay more than other districts to obtain the same level of student performance. Ferguson and Ladd (1996) show, for example, that students who move tend to come from poor families, and that, all else equal, students in classrooms experiencing high student mobility during the school year do not perform as well as students in more stable classrooms.
These costs go beyond wage costs. Schools with a relatively high concentration of at-risk students must hire more teachers (and more professional staff) than other schools to obtain the same level of student performance. Teachers may need to spend more time with at-risk students, for example, and schools may need to provide additional personnel to deal with health or other problems that at-risk students are more likely to have.
The relatively high cost of educating at-risk students is exactly what Justice DeGrasse was talking about in his opinion concerning CFE v. New York. If New York State wants to comply with the court's mandate, it must account for the high cost of at-risk students. In my view, the only way to account for these costs is with the help of a statistical procedure.
A Comprehensive Cost Index for New York State
I have estimated a new comprehensive education cost index for school districts in New York State. This index, which provides my best estimates of educational costs in New York State based on currently available data, summarizes the impact on educational costs of labor market conditions and of at-risk students.
8 For the purposes of this index, at-risk students are defined as those from a poor family, with limited English proficiency, or with a severe handicap.
This index is based on a regression analysis of the determinants of district spending per pupil in 1999. This analysis takes several steps to separate cost factors, which are outside a school district=s control, from quality choices and managerial efficiency, which reflect choices made by the district. First, it controls for school performance, as measured by an index that considers elementary and high-school passing rates on various tests. This index is discussed in more detail below. Second, it focuses on instructional spending, so that the cost index will not reflect variation in spending on school administration, where managerial inefficiency is particularly likely to arise.
9 Third, it controls for key determinants of school district efficiency.
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According to my index, educational costs vary widely from one school district to the next (see Table 2 ). 11 In New York City and Yonkers, the index is over 200, which indicates that the per pupil cost of education in those districts is over twice as high as the state average. The average cost index for the upstate big three, Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse, is also very high, namely, 163. Downstate small cities have the next highest average cost index, 142, while downstate suburbs and upstate small cities both come in at 112. Rural districts and upstate suburbs both have average indexes below 100, which means that their educational costs per pupil are below the state average. Although the regression on which these results are based performs well, this index is not, of course, the final word on the subject.
12 There are still some major gaps in the available data. 13 Moreover, scholars disagree about the right way to handle several technical issues that arise in estimating an educational cost index.
14 Nevertheless, this index is based on a well-known procedure and is broadly consistent with previous scholarly work on the topic. The debate should now focus on the best way to refine an educational cost index, not on whether estimating such an index is possible.
Educational Costs and State Aid Formulas
Most states now use some form of a foundation aid formula, an approach designed to ensure a minimum spending per pupil in every district (Gold et al. 1995) . The basic idea of this approach is for the state to make up the difference between this minimum spending level and the amount each district can raise at a certain minimum tax effort. This approach can easily be extended to consider educational costs. 15 Specifically, cost indexes can be directly incorporated into the state aid formula so that all districts are brought up to a minimum performance level, not a minimum spending level. Districts with higher costs obviously will have to spend more to meet this minimum performance.
Bringing costs into a foundation formula is particularly important when a state is attempting to impose higher standards on all school districts, which is the case in New York. Districts with high costs cannot be expected to meet new, higher standards if they do not have the resources they need to meet them. To put it another way, expecting high-cost districts to meet higher standards without giving them the necessary resources is profoundly unfair and a recipe for failure.
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To implement a cost-adjusted foundation aid formula, state policy makers must decide (1) what performance level is adequate and (2) how the burden of attaining it should be divided between state and local governments.
Defining Adequate Performance
In order to define a performance standard, policy makers must choose a way to measure performance and then select a level of performance that is deemed to be adequate. A typical performance measure is based on student test scores. One such measure, on which my proposal draws, is the share of students receiving a passing grade on the new English and math high school Regents tests. With this measure, a district is said to achieve an adequate performance if a certain share, say 80 percent, of students achieve this grade. A cost-based foundation aid formula recognizes that the cost of attaining this adequate performance level varies across districts because educational costs are higher in some districts than others. Moreover, the higher the adequate performance level, the most expensive the aid program.
Dividing the Burden between State and Local Governments
As noted earlier, a standard foundation aid program requires all districts to make a contribution themselves in the form of a minimum local tax effort. One survey conducted in 1994 found 22 states, not including New York, with foundation programs that required a minimum local effort (Gold et al. 1995) . Without this minimum-effort provision, school districts can set their tax rates so low that they do not reach the adequate performance level, even with generous state aid. Over the last several years, for example, the City of Syracuse has steadily cut its property tax rate as its state aid has increased (Duncombe 2001) . As a result, an aid program without this provision is not really a "foundation" program because it does not ensure that enough money is raised to fund the minimum adequate performance level in every district.
A cost-based foundation program makes up the difference between the spending required to meet the minimum performance and the revenue raised at the minimum allowable local tax effort. To put it another way, once the state aid budget has been set, it is possible to determine the local tax effort that is required to meet the educational adequacy standard selected by policy makers. The higher the state aid budget, the lower the minimum allowable local tax effort can be.
A Cost-Based State Aid Proposal
I propose a cost-based foundation aid plan based on my comprehensive educational cost index (Table 2) and an adequate education defined as the 1999 statewide average value for my school performance index, which reflects the Regents new graduation requirements. 17 Note that "adequate" is defined by the average passing rate on the new Regents exams, not the more demanding (and more costly!) target of a 100 percent passing rate. Even in the highest performing districts, some students do not pass these tests. 18 For example, the average suburb, downstate or upstate, has a passing rate between 76 and 80 percent on the English and math Regents tests. In contrast, New York City has a passing rate of about 35 percent on both tests. The aid formula is designed to bring New York City and other low-performing districts up to the statewide average. This plan calls for the implementation of a minimum-local-tax-effort provision in New York State. The impact of the plan on local tax effort depends on the state aid budget. I begin with the current state aid budget less building aid, transportation aid, and BOCES aid, which results in an aid budget of $10.69 billion.
19 At this budget level, the required minimum local tax effort would have to be three and one-half times as high as the current average local tax effort; that is, lowperforming school districts would have to come up with most of the funds themselves (see Table 3 ). Adding $10 billion to the current budget would bring the required minimum local tax effort down to about 25 percent above the current average local tax effort. The current average local tax effort is 1.125%; this equals local tax revenue (from all taxes) for instructional purposes divided by the local property tax base. Source: Author's calculations. The current aid budget equals total state aid in 1999 less building aid, excess cost aid, transportation aid, and BOCES aid; the minimum allowable local tax effort is the local effort required to bring all districts up to the current average for the performance index in Appendix Part 3; see Appendix Part 4.
Because educational costs vary so much across districts and because current aid programs virtually ignore this variation, my proposed plan would dramatically change the distribution of state aid (see Tables 4  and 5 ). Regardless of the state aid budget, aid to the big-five districts (Buffalo, New York City, Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers) would increase significantly, and aid to suburbs and rural districts would decrease dramatically. Indeed, most suburbs and many rural districts would not receive any basic operating aid under this plan, even with a large state budget (although they would still receive building aid, transportation aid, and BOCES aid). Aid to small cities would not change as much, but it also declines unless the state aid budget increases dramatically. 
Conclusions
Educational costs clearly depend on local labor market conditions and the presence of at-risk students-factors that are outside the control of local school officials. Ad hoc procedures, such as those used in current state aid programs in New York, cannot provide accurate measures of educational costs. Regional cost indexes, which fail to recognize the extensive variation in educational costs within a region, also are seriously deficient.
Educational cost indexes can be estimated with well-known statistical procedures and available data (although better data would allow them to be refined further). My estimates show that educational costs vary widely across the state, with particularly high costs in the big-five school districts. Because they do not adequately account for these cost differences, current state educational aid programs severely shortchange students in needy school districts.
I propose a new state aid program that recognizes these cost differences and brings all districts up to the average current performance on the new Regents standards. This program requires some combination of a large increase in state funding, a substantial redistribution of state aid toward needy districts, and a required minimum local tax effort. Without a large increase in state aid, this target can be achieved only by setting a required minimum local tax effort that is far above the current effort of most districts and by eliminating basic operating aid for all but the neediest districts. Even with a doubling of state operating aid, this target cannot be achieved without setting a minimum local tax effort that is above the current average and eliminating basic operating aid for some districts with relatively low needs.
Higher funding for needy districts does not guarantee better student performance there, but no district can reach a high student performance level without the funds to attract good teachers and to pay for the added expenses of its at-risk students. The best approach is to make sure every district has the funding it needs to provide a quality education and then to help all districts identify best practices and hold them accountable for the results. Anything less would perpetuate a system that unfairly penalizes students in the state's large cities and other needy school districts.
Endnotes
Because the Supreme Court is not the highest court in New York
State, this opinion is probably not the last word on the subject. Governor George Pataki has stated his intention to appeal Justice DeGrasse=s decision.
2. A more detailed discussion of these concepts can be found in Duncombe and Yinger (1999) . See also, Downes and Pogue (1994) and Reschovsky and Imazeki (1998) .
3. The link between costs and aid is discussed in more detail in Ladd and Yinger (1994) , Duncombe and Yinger (1998b) , and Reschovsky and Imazeki (1998) .
4. For a discussion of this program, see Bradbury et al. (1984) . Table 6. 7. See, for example, Duncombe and Yinger (1999) and the studies cited therein. For an insightful practitioner's look at the same issues, see Kingon (2001 Duncombe and Yinger, forthcoming) . The index in this policy brief improves on the earlier Duncombe/Yinger index in two important ways: First, it is based on much more current data: 1999 instead of 1991. Second, it shows the cost of obtaining an adequate education, with reference to the new Regents graduation requirements. The previous index was based on the passing rates for more advanced exams.
9. Leaving out administration does not make a lot of difference, however; a regression based on operating spending per pupil yields very similar results.
10. In particular, the regression controls for the ratio of income to property value, a measure of the share of taxes paid by voters, and for the difference between a district's aid per capita and the aid received by similar districts. Previous studies (Duncombe and Yinger forthcoming, 1998a) , have found that these variables have a significant impact on school district efficiency. Appendix Table 6. 12. Specifically, the estimated coefficients in this regression all have the expected signs and virtually all are statistically significant. See Appendix Table 2. 13. For example, teachers' test scores, which are not now publicly available, would improve the controls for teacher quality in the estimation of the wage cost index.
Index values for individual school districts are presented in
14. See the studies cited in the references.
15. See Ladd and Yinger (1984) , Duncombe and Yinger (1998b) , and Reschovsky and Imazeki (1998) .
16. For more on this issue, see Duncombe and Yinger (1998a and Ladd et al. (1999) .
17. This performance index, which is also used in the regression analysis in Appendix Table 2 , is defined in detail in Appendix Part 3.
18. These are the shares of students entering in 1996 who have reached the passing level by the end of their junior year in 1999. Thus, the final passing rates, at the end of their senior year, could be higher.
19. Building aid, transportation aid, and BOCES aid involve different cost issues than basic operating spending for schools, and therefore are left out of my basic aid formula. Under my proposal, all districts would retain the funds they now receive under these three programs. In the future, the state could bring more careful cost adjustments into these formulas as well. 
Part 1. Problems with the Index in the Midstate Proposal
The index used in the Midstate proposal is based on Chambers (1997 Chambers ( , 1998 . It relies on 1993-94 data that are available on the National Center for Education Statistics Web site <http://www.nces.ed.gov>.
Two aspects of this index are troubling. First, the index in the Midstate proposal contains an error, namely, that it uses use pupil-weighted average costs as a base instead of costs in the average district. As in Appendix Part 4, this index is used to determine how much more a district must spend than the average district to obtain the same performance. As a result, spending on the average pupil is not relevant and the Midstate cost index is not consistent with the Midstate aid formula. Without this error, the index value for New York City would be 112 instead of 104.
Second, the regression analysis on which the Chambers index is based has four serious limitations.
(1) The data, which come from 1993-1994, are out of date. (2) The estimated coefficients are based on national relationships, not relationships in New York State. (3) The regression does not directly control for private wages, and therefore yields biased results. (4) The regression includes only two variables related to a district's classroom environment, district enrollment and the share of students who belong to a minority group. As a result, most across-district variation in the classroom environment is omitted from the index. Moreover, minority composition is not a legitimate cost variable and I do not include it in my index. The Chambers approach also combines teacher cost information with ad hoc adjustments for energy and other input costs to obtain a cost-of-education index.
Part 2. Regression Results
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 present the regressions on which the educational wage cost index and the comprehensive educational cost index, respectively, are based. In both cases, the cost index is calculated in three steps. First, for each school district, the value of each cost variable is multiplied by its regression coefficient. Second, these products are summed across cost variables. Third, this sum is divided by the sum in the average district and multiplied by 100. An index of 200 indicates that a district has educational costs that are twice as high as those in the average district. The dependent variable is the log of annual salary. Source: Author's calculations, based on data for 145,651 full-time teachers in New York State in 1999.
Harsh classroom conditions increase the wage that a district must pay to attract teachers of a given quality. However, a district may choose not to respond to harsh conditions by raising wages but may instead keep its wages low and accept lower-quality teachers. In the wage equation, therefore, the coefficient of a variable measuring classroom conditions could be positive or negative. It will be positive if districts must pay higher wages to attract teachers, controlling for observable measures of teacher quality; it will be negative if districts respond to higher wage requirements by selecting teachers with poorer unobservable quality characteristics. As a result, I interpret a variable measuring classroom conditions as a cost variable only if its coefficient is positive.
In the general cost regression (Appendix Table 2 ), the variables measuring district enrollment could be interpreted as cost variables because they are largely outside a district=s control. At least in principle, however, districts have access to policies, such as consolidation, that could alter their enrollment. As a result, enrollment is not considered to be a cost factor. According to the regression results, treating enrollment as a cost factor would raise the cost indexes for both small districts and large cities. 
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Part 3. Details of Aid Proposal
Definition of Student Performance
The definition of student performance used in this analysis is a composite of student test scores in fourth grade, eighth grade, and high school. This composite reflects 6 test scores in a district: These six test-score measures were weighted to reflect the years of schooling to which they applied. Each measure was multiplied by the number of years of schooling to which it referred (4, 8, or 11). The weights were scaled so that they would add up to one.
Cost-Based Foundation Aid Formula
The formula for a cost-based foundation aid program is:
This formula can be used to derive the minimum local effort, t, for any state budget, B:
where The tables in this part of the appendix present an alternative aid program. This program uses the same formulas as the proposal in the text (see Part 3 above), but it differs from this proposal in the text in two ways. First, it is based on my educational wage cost index (see Table 1 ) instead of my comprehensive educational cost index (Table  2) . Second, this program is based on a total aid budget of $8.73 billion, instead of $10.79 billion because it does not replace the current Excess Cost Aid programs. The current average local tax effort is 1.125%, which equals local tax revenue (from all taxes) for instructional purposes divided by the local property tax base. The current aid budget equals total state aid in 1999 less building aid, excess cost aid, transportation aid, and BOCES aid. The minimum allowable local tax effort is the local effort required to bring all districts up to the current average for the performance index in Appendix Part 3; see Appendix Part 4. Source: Author's calculations. These two differences are related. An aid program based on wage costs does not adjust for the fact that some districts must hire more teachers (of equal quality) than others in order to obtain the same student performance. For example, such an aid program does not account for the costs associated with students who have special needs. This is an important limitation. The current Excess Cost Aid programs are designed to pay the expenses associated with students who have special needs. These programs are retained in this alternative aid program because, to some degree, they offset the limitation in the aid program based on wage costs. Current aid amounts and the current aid budget are based on total state aid less building aid, transportation aid, and BOCES aid; the averages include districts that receive no aid. Source: Author's calculations, based on the cost index in Table 1 and the formula in Appendix Part 3. Current aid amounts and the current aid budget are based on total state aid less building aid, transportation aid, and BOCES aid. Source: Author's calculations, based on the index in Table 2 and the formula in Appendix Part 3.
Appendix
This program also differs from the recent proposal by the Board of Regents (2000) because it uses a wage cost index for each district, not each region, and because it is makes use of a cost-based foundation aid formula with a minimum-local-tax-effort requirement.
Part 5. Cost Indexes for Individual School Districts
The following table presents the comprehensive cost index (summarized in Table 2 ) and the wage cost index (Table 1) for each of the school districts in my sample. 
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